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Abstract 
EPA will soon propose performance standards under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act for 
greenhouse gas pollution from the two largest emitting stationary source sectors—fossil-fueled power 
plants and petroleum refineries. The form these standards will take remains unclear. A key issue that will 
shape the effectiveness of the regulations is the degree to which they enable regulated entities to use 
flexible approaches to achieve the standards. This discussion paper provides the content of a letter to EPA 
Administrator Jackson that describes areas of general academic agreement on the EPA‟s authority to use 
compliance flexibility options under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act in the development of performance 
standards for greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Prevailing Academic View on Compliance Flexibility under § 111 of 
the Clean Air Act 
Gregory E. Wannier, Jason A. Schwartz, Nathan Richardson, Michael A. Livermore, 
Michael B. Gerrard, and Dallas Burtraw 
Executive Summary 
EPA will soon propose performance standards under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act for 
greenhouse gas pollution from the two largest emitting sectors—fossil-fueled power plants and 
petroleum refineries. The form these standards will take remains unclear. Many from industry, 
environmental groups, and academia argue that to be effective and efficient, the standards should 
incorporate compliance flexibility. This broad term encompasses a range of design choices that 
provide spatial or temporal flexibility in achieving aggregate emissions outcomes. 
There is widespread agreement in the academic community that § 111 authorizes the use 
of many types of flexible approaches. Given agency discretion to define uncertain statutory terms 
like “best system of emission reduction,” and given the potential of compliance flexibility 
mechanisms to reduce costs while preserving total emissions reduction goals, EPA and the states 
should be able to fit a variety of flexible approaches into the statutory criteria for performance 
standards. 
EPA and states can likely grant compliance flexibility to existing sources. EPA can 
outline specific flexible structures in its guidance to states, though it likely cannot reject state 
implementation plans solely for failure to adopt a flexible approach.  
Compliance flexibility may be possible for new sources, albeit limited in practice. 
The plain statutory text supports flexibility for new sources, though a lack of precedent and 
possible interactions with New Source Review could complicate application.  
Inter-sector trading is probably permissible. EPA has broad statutory authority to 
define the scope of categories of regulated polluters. EPA can likely define a category 
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encompassing multiple types of major greenhouse gas emitters, and thereby allow trading 
between sources currently in different categories. Alternatively, even without newly defined or 
larger categories, there is no express statutory preclusion to trading across existing categories. 
No consensus exists on whether offsets are permissible. But even if offsets are not 
compatible with performance standards, states have broad authority to use offsets for additional 
emissions reductions.  
 Banking and price floors are likely permissible; borrowing and price ceilings are 
more uncertain. States likely have broad powers to assign compliance responsibilities among 
sources, including the allocation of allowances within a trading program. Whether EPA‟s powers 
are as broad is unclear.  
Pre-planned changes in the breadth and stringency of standards over time are likely 
permissible. Both EPA and the states can likely identify a schedule of incremental steps over 
time to implement additional emissions reductions and lower costs. 
 
Compliance Flexibility Tool  Legal under CAA? 
General compliance flexibility (existing sources)  Probably 
General compliance flexibility (new sources)  No consensus* 
EPA rejection of state plans granting more/less flexibility  Probably not 
Inter-sector trading  Probably 
Offsets  No consensus 
Banking  Probably  
Borrowing  No consensus 
Price floors  Probably  
Price ceilings  No consensus 
Declining caps/increasing stringency  Probably  
State programs that exceed EPA-mandated stringency  Probably  
State use of tools unavailable under CAA  Probably** 
Discretionary allocation/auction authority (states)  Probably 
Discretionary allocation/auction authority (EPA)  No consensus 
*Even if permissible, New Source Review may be a practical barrier. 




EPA will soon propose performance 
standards under Section 111 of the Clean 
Air Act (CAA) for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
pollution from the two largest emitting 
sectors—fossil-fueled power plants and 
petroleum refineries. These standards will 
apply to both new sources and, via § 111(d) 
and the states, existing sources—they will 
be the first federal GHG regulations on these 
sources.  
The form these standards will take 
remains unclear. Many from industry, 
environmental groups, and academia argue 
that to be effective and efficient, the 
standards should incorporate compliance 
flexibility.1  This broad term encompasses a 
range of design choices that provide spatial 
or temporal flexibility in achieving 
aggregate emissions outcomes. The array of 
policy options includes tradable rate-based 
performance standards, bubbles over 
commonly owned facilities, trading between 
plant-specific lifetime emissions budgets, 
and nationwide emissions budgets with 
market-based exchange, with banking and 
borrowing—all of which feature the 
common characteristic of lowering costs 
without sacrificing ultimate emissions goals.
 
Overview of Statutory Structure 
Section 111 of the CAA governs EPA’s powers 
to set performance standards for “source 
categories” (sectors) defined by the agency. 
First, the agency must list categories of 
stationary sources that contribute 
significantly to air pollution that endangers 
public health or welfare.2  Once a category has 
been defined, EPA must propose a federal 
standard of performance to regulate all new 
sources within that category.3  These 
standards must reflect emissions cuts 
achievable under “the best system of 
emission reduction which . . . the 
administrator determines has been 
adequately demonstrated,” taking into 
account costs and other factors.4  
For pollution regulated elsewhere under the 
CAA, the § 111 process ends here. But if 
emissions from existing sources are not 
controlled via other CAA regulation (and so 
far for GHG emissions, they are not), § 111(d) 
of the CAA authorizes EPA to regulate them 
with performance standards.5  EPA sets 
guidelines for these standards, but the states 
implement them. This process is explicitly 
similar to that found in § 110 of the CAA6 and 
requires states to submit a plan establishing a 
“standard of performance for any existing 
source for any air pollutant.”7  States have 
broad flexibility to implement § 111(d) 
standards,8 though EPA retains approval 
power and the ability to regulate if a state 
fails to do so.9  The only explicit limitations on 
state authority are the requirement that they 
establish “performance standards” and the 
EPA regulations requiring that plans be at 
least as stringent as, and occur at least as 
quickly as, the federal guidelines, creating a 
federal emissions backstop.10  
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This document addresses whether the CAA, and specifically § 111, allows EPA to use 
these tools. Generally the relevant legal questions have not yet been directly answered by the 
courts.
11  Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement in the academic community that § 111 
does authorize the use of many types of flexible approaches. This document explores some areas 
of potential confusion surrounding flexibility and § 111. Where the prevailing academic view is 
identified, the findings presented reflect general agreement in the academic community and the 
unanimous position of the authors.  
FINDING 1:  EPA and states can likely grant compliance flexibility to existing 
sources. 
Compliance flexibility (as defined above) for existing sources is almost certainly 
available to state authorities. EPA can outline specific flexible structures in its guidance to states, 
though it likely cannot reject state implementation plans solely for failure to adopt a flexible 
approach. 
A. Fundamental Justifications for a Flexible System 
Section 111 of the CAA allows for a high degree of flexibility in implementing standards 
of performance. As defined under § 111, a standard of performance is based on “the best system 
of emission reduction . . . taking into account the cost.”  This language almost certainly is broad 
enough to enable both EPA and states to incorporate compliance flexibility:  using their statutory 
discretion, those authorities can define many flexible approaches as the most efficient (and 
therefore the “best”) systems for reducing emissions at the sector level.
12  This discretion to 
define statutory criteria is central to EPA and states‟ ability to implement any flexibility 
mechanisms. 
The minority opposing view holds that flexible mechanisms cannot be justified, based on 
an assumed negative inference from statutory silence on specific flexibility mechanisms. A 
further objection claims that § 111 requires regulation of individual sources, implying no single 
source can be allowed to emit more and then pay for it.
13  However, particularly given the 
deference owed to agencies under Chevron v. NRDC,
14 such a negative inference is unwarranted. 
Courts do not typically act on negative inferences without clear congressional intent.
15  
Furthermore, to the extent that Congress has spoken on the issue, it has removed, rather than 
added, barriers to flexible mechanisms in EPA regulations. In 1990, Congress amended § 111 to 
remove the word “technology” from its definition of performance standards, indicating that 
standards need not be technology-based.
16 Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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The legality of flexibility for existing sources under § 111 also has support from past 
EPA actions. EPA explicitly agreed with, and defended, this interpretation in its 2005 Clean Air 
Mercury Rule (CAMR).
17  It is true that EPA‟s interpretation does not have a long history; as 
recently as 1998, EPA believed that “trading across plant boundaries is impermissible under 
sections 111 and 112.”
18  However, agencies have generally been granted deference in their 
evolving interpretation of statutes.
19 
Moreover, states may have some augmented authority to use compliance flexibility for 
existing sources. Section 111(d) gives states extra authority to consider “other factors” when 
regulating existing sources. Additionally, the § 111(d) procedure explicitly mimics the § 110 
process, which grants states great leeway in designing State Implementation Plan equivalents 
(SIPe)—and which specifically mentions the use of “economic incentives such as . . . marketable 
permits, and auctions of emissions rights.”
20 
B. EPA Guidance and Approval of SIP-like State Programs 
EPA has the authority to outline flexible structures in its guidance to states on existing 
source regulation, either in the form of a specific preferred option or by listing several alternative 
options.
21  EPA almost certainly also has the authority to implement flexible systems in any 
Federal Implementation Plan equivalent (FIPe), because the CAA gives EPA the identical 
authority as states in the design of a federal “backstop” program for existing sources.
22  In fact, if 
EPA includes some of these flexible mechanisms in its proposed FIPe, it may reduce some of the 
uncertainty around the question of state equivalency (which is measured against a federal 
backstop that the FIPe helps to set). 
There has been little scholarship on whether states will be able to submit a joint or 
coordinated SIPe, which would allow trading between states and might be useful in meshing 
CAA standards with existing regional trading programs (like RGGI). However, neither is there 
any explicit statutory bar. A limitation on joint SIPes might arise if EPA interprets the statute to 
require each individual state to develop equivalency with the federal standards. In such a 
scenario, states buying allowances from other states might fail to reduce their own emissions 
sufficiently. A negative inference against joint bids may also arise from the fact that other 
sections of the CAA do explicitly allow for state coordination. However, nothing in the statute 
requires that EPA mandate state compliance on an individualized basis,
23 and so states can likely 
assert this flexibility. Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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States retain substantial discretion under the CAA to design their own SIPes for existing 
sources.
24  EPA probably lacks the ability to disapprove a given SIPe simply for failing to 
include flexibility mechanisms that EPA might prefer. States otherwise achieving sufficient 
reductions cannot be forced to implement any specific flexible system. Nor, conversely, could 
EPA disapprove a SIPe that includes flexibility that the model rule does not, so long as the 
flexibility mechanisms are allowable under the CAA. 
State efforts to implement reductions through other techniques, including renewable 
portfolio standards (RPSs), demand-side management, utility planning, and other indirect 
emission reduction systems, might also qualify for SIPe treatment to the extent that they achieve 
equivalent emissions reductions and satisfy the criteria of “performance standards.”  EPA has 
issued guidance that would allow states to claim credit for emissions reductions of criteria 
pollutants (like ozone) achieved through adopting energy efficiency and RPS measures under 
their § 110 SIPs.
25  Because § 111(d) allows states to consider “other factors” and makes explicit 
reference to following a § 110 SIP-like process, it is possible that states could similarly receive 
credit for RPSs and energy efficiency efforts under § 111.
26 
C. Potential Conflict with NAAQS 
There is no legal certainty on whether EPA can be forced to adopt National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for greenhouse gases. This is a complex question outside the scope 
of this document.
27  However, if EPA were forced to adopt a GHG NAAQS (or chose to do so), 
regulation of existing sources under § 111(d) would be prohibited.
28  It is worth noting that the 
legal path to forcing EPA to issue NAAQS would be a very long one:  even if this potential 
conflict does eventually become a problem, a §111-based program could operate successfully for 
many years. 
FINDING 2:  Compliance flexibility may be possible for new sources, albeit limited 
in practice. 
The plain statutory text supports flexibility for new sources, though a lack of precedent 
and possible interactions with New Source Review could complicate application.  
A. Fundamental Justifications for a Flexible System 
Unlike states‟ authority over existing sources under § 111(d), Congress did not grant EPA 
leeway to consider “other factors” or use SIP-like mechanisms to regulate new sources under § 
111(b).
29  EPA‟s ability to use flexible mechanisms therefore turns entirely on whether such Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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approaches fit the definition of “performance standard.”  As explored above, flexible 
mechanisms can satisfy all the criteria of a performance standard under the plain statutory text.
30 
Nevertheless, the application of flexible approaches to new sources is legally and 
practically more uncertain than for existing sources. The negative inference argument is 
plausibly stronger for new sources, given legislative history that continued to link new source 
standards to technology-specific controls even after the 1990 Amendments.
31  The regulatory 
precedent is also weaker:  though EPA did include new sources in the market created by CAMR, 
that rule also simultaneously bound new sources to baseline performance standards.
32  Finally, 
some argue that a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision, ASARCO v. EPA, disallowed trading 
under § 111(b), although EPA and others believe the subsequent Supreme Court case Chevron v. 
NRDC invalidated ASARCO. We further note that the statute has been amended since both those 
cases and the original decision concerned the definition of “source” rather than “performance 
standard”
33—ASARCO‟s holding apparently would not apply to an EPA definition of compliance 
flexibility as “the best system of emission reduction.” 
Ultimately, courts typically only accept negative inferences if they are confident that 
Congress intended to preclude the unmentioned policy option.
34  Additionally, agencies are 
generally granted deference in their evolving interpretation of statutes,
35 and EPA will be 
afforded some discretion to interpret the statutory criteria for “performance standards” under § 
111(b).
36  Thus, flexible mechanisms are likely available for new sources,
37 though they remain a 
risky option because they are untested.
38  A safer option might be for EPA to issue baseline 
performance standards for new sources (as it did in CAMR) and, in a separate and severable 
rulemaking, incorporate new sources under a single flexible regime with existing sources. 
Note that any limitations on EPA‟s authority to regulate new sources under § 111(b)—
either due to negative inferences or legal precedents—will not affect its more expansive 
authority to regulate existing sources with a § 111(d) FIPe in lieu of adequate state action. 
B. Potential Interactions with New Source Review 
New sources are also subject to permit requirements under a different CAA program:  
new source review (NSR). Traditionally, performance standards are less stringent than NSR‟s 
“best available control technology” (BACT) requirements.
39  As the flexibility created under § 
111 incentivizes new sources to adopt tighter emissions controls, emerging technologies may 
become “available” for purposes of BACT determinations and ratchet up NSR requirements even Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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further. EPA will likely need to provide guidance on the interaction between §111 performance 
standards and NSR, particularly if flexibility for new sources is explored. 
FINDING 3:  Inter-sector trading is probably permissible. 
EPA has broad statutory authority to define the scope of categories of regulated polluters. 
EPA can likely define a category encompassing multiple types of major greenhouse gas emitters, 
and thereby allow trading between sources currently in different categories. Alternatively, even 
without newly defined or larger categories, there is no express statutory preclusion to trading 
across existing categories. 
A. Defining Source Categories 
EPA has broad authority to “distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within categories 
of new sources.”
40  Courts have found EPA has “considerable discretion under section 111” and 
have upheld EPA‟s decision to issue a single, uniform standard for sources that were previously 
treated as separate subcategories.
41  Thus, EPA can likely expand any existing category to 
include sources from any other existing category or newly regulated source types (though the 
latter would also require a new endangerment finding). EPA could even plausibly create a single 
category for all sources with GHG emissions above a certain threshold. While EPA should be 
able to exercise this authority to recategorize at any time, it could be more complicated legally or 
practically for EPA to adjust categories in the future after performance standards already exist. 
Though EPA is only contemplating GHG performance standards for one or two categories 
initially, if the agency wants to pursue this option of combining multiple categories in the future, 
it may want to start soliciting comments now. 
B. Trading Between Source Categories 
There is no express statutory preclusion to trading across existing categories. In fact, a 
flexible mechanism that allows trading across categories could arguably fit the definition of “the 
best system of emission reduction.”
42  Nevertheless, several academics worry that the lack of 
clear statutory authority or precedent creates some doubt, particularly on the question of whether 
state equivalency must be demonstrated independently in every regulated category.
43  The 
existence of such doubts may suggest that the recategorization method discussed above is the 
least risky path to inter-sector trading. In any case, states with emissions limits more stringent 
than EPA‟s could allow inter-category trading to meet emissions goals beyond EPA‟s. EPA will 
likely need to provide guidance on how states will establish equivalency.  Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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C. Other Coverage Issues 
A few other legal issues relating to flexibility and scope of coverage are worth 
mentioning. As with EPA‟s § 202 endangerment finding, the agency should be able to define the 
targeted pollutant under § 111 as the mix of all GHGs;
44 therefore, trading among GHGs should 
not present any legal problems. Trading between states is also plausibly permissible; though the 
D.C. Circuit recently limited interstate trading of other pollutants in North Carolina v. EPA, that 
decision was based on language in §110 that does not apply to §111 regulation.
45  
However, there are some limitations on the scope of potential flexibility programs under 
§ 111. For example, the categories of sources covered by § 111 only include “buildings, 
structures, facilities, or installations which emit or may emit any air pollutant.”
46  Since upstream 
sources of GHGs, like natural gas importers, do not directly emit the pollution generated when a 
consumer burns the natural gas it processed or sold, these indirect emissions likely cannot be 
covered under § 111. 
FINDING 4:  No consensus exists on whether offsets are permissible. 
Consensus is lacking on whether offsets are compatible with § 111 performance 
standards. Even if not, states have broad authority to use offsets for additional emissions 
reductions. 
A. Offsets under § 111(d) 
As noted above, the prevailing view among legal scholars is that EPA, states operating 
under § 111(d) regulations, and states operating independently can permit trading among sources 
covered by regulation. This general agreement breaks down somewhat when considering 
whether emissions reduction measures taken outside the regulated sphere can be included within 
trading programs. The most prominent such measures are offsets. 
Analysts taking the position that offsets are permissible point to elements of legislative 
history, like the statute‟s move away from requirements for on-site, technology-based 
compliance and congressional references to allowable reductions achieved by third parties;
47 to 
the lack of statutory preclusion;
48 and to the explicit availability of a limited class of offsets 
under NAAQS.
49  Other proponents argue that it is difficult to draw principled distinctions 
between inter-sector trading (see Finding #3 above) and offsets.
50 
Those taking the opposite position argue that the availability of NAAQS offsets generates 
a negative inference,
51 or that offsets appear incompatible with the source category-driven design Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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of § 111.
52  Section 111 performance standards, unlike NAAQS, explicitly target emissions 
reductions from regulated source categories, rather than concentrations of a regulated pollutant.
53  
Offset critics argue that this may pose a modest problem for offsets created by reducing 
emissions at unregulated facilities, since they do not reduce emissions from any regulated source 
category. They further suggest that it poses more serious problems for offsets that have no effect 
on emissions, but putatively affect ambient greenhouse gas concentrations (such as forest 
offsets).
54 
B. Federal-State Interactions under § 111(d) 
There appear to be few limits on states‟ ability to incorporate offsets into their 
independent state and regional-level programs, such as AB32 and RGGI.
55  If states are able to 
use offsets (or other alternative compliance mechanisms) in their independent programs, but not 
under § 111(d), the relationship between the CAA and state/regional programs becomes more 
complex. To the extent that emitters use offsets or other tools to comply with state program 
requirements, EPA and the states may be unable to count those reductions for purposes of 
compliance with § 111(d) regulations. This is not necessarily fatal to efforts to achieve 
compatibility:  the CAA does not preempt state programs, which would presumably be more 
stringent. Offsets and related tools could still be used to meet this additional compliance burden.  
It is not clear whether a state could implement more stringent regulation, perhaps 
including offsets, via its SIPe (relying on CAA authority)
56 or if separate supporting state 
legislation would be required. Constitutional limits on state power (for example, the requirement 
for congressional approval of inter-state compacts,
57 or the inability of states to engage in 
binding international agreements
58) may also limit certain types of offset arrangements.  
FINDING 5:  States have broad allocation authority; EPA’s powers are less clear. 
Banking and price floors are likely permissible; borrowing and price ceilings are 
more uncertain. 
States likely have broad powers to assign compliance responsibilities among sources, 
including the allocation of allowances within a trading program. Whether EPA‟s powers are as 
broad is unclear. Banking and price floors are likely permissible, though there is no consensus on 
borrowing or price ceilings. Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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A. General Allocation Authority 
States almost certainly have the authority to allocate permits however they choose, 
provided minimum federal emissions standards are still met.
59  For example, states could conduct 
a coordinated auction or distribute permits in a manner that promotes policy goals, such as 
protecting consumers by allocating based on output in order to lessen electricity price changes 
and preserve in-state generation, or rewarding individual facilities for repowering and/or biomass 
use.
60  EPA can also allocate permits in many different ways. There is no consensus on whether 
EPA can auction permits,
61 but if it can, any revenue would need to go directly to the treasury.
62  
B. Banking and Borrowing 
Several existing market-based approaches to flexible compliance include banking and 
borrowing mechanisms, whereby excess reductions can be saved for future compliance periods 
or facilities with insufficient reductions can pay extra in future compliance periods. Unlimited 
banking would probably not compromise state equivalency requirements, because emissions 
reductions need only be realized at least as quickly as the federal standard.
63  
Borrowing against future compliance periods is more legally ambiguous, since it could 
violate the requirement that a SIPe achieve reductions at least as quickly as the EPA backstop 
would. Some scholars have pointed to § 110(a)(2)(A), which allows SIPs to include schedules 
and timetables for compliance, as granting states some independence on the timeline for 
compliance from federal norms (recall that § 111(d) references the § 110 SIP-approval 
process).
64  Further, the ability of states to account for “other factors” under § 111(d) may imply 
that states can consider future compliance promises in allowing more immediate deviations from 
EPA baselines. However, there is no academic consensus on whether such language in fact 
justifies borrowing. The strongest language against borrowing comes in EPA‟s own requirements 
that state plans achieve emission reductions “at least as quickly” as the federal baseline
65—
though this requirement is not explicitly mandated by the statutory text, and EPA could change 
this regulation in the context of GHGs in order to more clearly permit some borrowing 
mechanisms. 
C. Cost-Containment Mechanisms 
Another common feature of emissions markets is a floor and ceiling price beyond which 
no allowances can be sold. A floor price does not present any complications, because if it has 
any effect, it will be to reduce emissions. However, a ceiling price on allowances enforced with 
an unlimited ability to buy allowances at a given maximum price could (similar to offsets, above) Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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cause a SIPe to fail the equivalency requirement. A ceiling price that works by borrowing future 
allowances might be permissible if borrowing itself is allowed. 
The ability of states to consider cost and other factors in setting up their emissions 
reduction systems under § 111(d) may independently allow for controls on allowance prices.
66  
EPA may be able to reduce some of the uncertainty around the question of state equivalency and 
price ceilings if it uses its own statutory authority to apply reasonable cost constraints to its FIPe 
and emissions standards.
67  States could then likely set a price ceiling at or above EPA‟s own 
determination of reasonable costs. 
FINDING 6:  Pre-planned changes in the breadth and stringency of standards over 
time is likely permissible. 
Both EPA and the states can likely identify a schedule of incremental steps over time to 
implement additional emissions reductions and lower costs.  
The text and structure of § 111 likely authorize rulemakings that both set an initial 
emissions reduction target and establish a schedule for incremental steps over time to implement 
additional reductions. It is possible that § 111(b)(1)(B)‟s description of a specific process for the 
review and revision of performance standards creates a negative inference against a prospective 
timetable of automatically increasing requirements. However, the eight-year review process 
could apply as easily to prospective timetables; the provision requires retrospective analysis 
regardless of the rule‟s form, but it does not bind EPA‟s hands on policy design choices. 
The real question is whether an automatic timetable could fit the definition of a 
“performance standard.”  Performance standards must reflect the degree of emissions limitations 
achievable through application of the best system adequately demonstrated. However, at least as 
applied to new sources, the courts have found that § 111 “looks toward what may fairly be 
projected for the regulated future, rather than the state of the art at present.”
68  Neither 
“adequately demonstrated” nor “achievable” means that the standard is limited to what can 
already be routinely achieved.
69  While EPA cannot base standards on pure theory or speculation, 
it can make reasonable extrapolations of technological performance.
70  This understanding of the 
definition of “performance standard” could support a rule that prospectively sets a schedule of 
incremental steps. 
EPA‟s mandate to consider costs
71 could also support such an interpretation of its 
authority. Implementation costs will be affected by the implementation schedule. A timetable 
allows the agency to gradually increase the emissions limitations in line with cost-sensitive Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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predictions about the rate of technological development. If the agency instead were forced to set 
a single standard meant to govern for the foreseeable future, that standard would likely be 
initially more stringent and, therefore, more costly. 
States should also have the ability to establish a series of incremental steps under § 
111(d). As described above,
72 states are given two sources of additional authority under § 111(d). 
First, the section references the procedures under § 110; section 110 specifically notes the states‟ 
ability to set “schedules and timetables for compliance.”
73  Second, § 111(d) instructs states to 
consider other relevant factors, including the remaining useful life of existing sources. One way 
to account for the remaining lifetimes of plants might be to establish a timetable of gradually 
increasing stringency. 
Even if EPA or the states choose not to exercise this authority to adopt mandatory 
timetables with incremental steps, they can still include non-binding language in the rule or the 
preamble signaling future intent to increase stringency, redefine categories, or make other 
changes. If the agency does ultimately make substantive changes to its policies pursuant to such 
signaling statements, new rulemakings would be required. But in the meantime, such signals can 
be helpful in aligning expectations and investments in the regulated community, even though 
such signaling statements are not likely binding on the agency. Moreover, either the signaling of 
intent or enactment of a series of incremental steps could be relevant to the ability of the United 
States to make commitments in international negotiations.  
Conclusion 
There is agreement—broad among legal academics and universal among the authors 
here—that EPA has the tools under § 111 of the CAA to implement relatively flexible and 
efficient GHG regulation. The agency could use a range of compliance flexibility options itself, 
or facilitate state implementation plans that adopt such measures at the state or regional level.  
EPA appears to have authority to include many specific flexible or market-design tools in 
§ 111 regulation, including tradable performance standards operating across sectors, price floors, 
banking of credits or allowances, and, in principle, nationwide cap-and-trade. Regulations likely 
can also increase in breadth or stringency over time—EPA appears to have the authority (and the 
opportunity) to achieve ambitious environmental goals while providing regulatory predictability 
to industry. These tools can make CAA policy more effective and more efficient. More broadly, 
EPA can—indeed must—consider both costs and other environmental impacts in setting GHG 
performance standards.  Resources for the Future  Wannier et al. 
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Authority under § 111 is not unlimited and at times not clear, however. For instance, it is 
unclear whether EPA can grant full compliance flexibility to new sources. Moreover, even for 
existing sources it is unclear what powers EPA would have to allocate any allowances, and 
whether the use of offsets, borrowing, or price ceilings by either the states or EPA would be 
compatible with § 111 standards. Courts (or Congress) may ultimately resolve these 
ambiguities—though litigation is likely even if EPA is cautious. 
States are key to the CAA pathway. The statute allows and requires substantial 
participation by the states, which retain significant control over the degree of compliance 
flexibility allowed for in-state emitters regardless of EPA‟s position. If their chosen system 
involves emissions allowances, states can likely allocate them as they see fit. States can also 
regulate more stringently than EPA if they wish—§ 111 regulation does not preempt existing 
state emissions programs like RGGI and AB32. Tools unavailable to EPA likely remain 
available to the states in their presumably more stringent programs, though states that use such 
tools may be forced to choose between subjecting emitters to dual requirements or allowing their 
use only for the additional local compliance burden. 
The above uncertainty should not, however, distract from the larger conclusion that EPA 
has much of the authority it needs. To forgo compliance flexibility would be excessively 
cautious; arguably, carefully designed compliance flexibility is required for the agency to meet 
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